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 The theory of apoha has attracted a fair amount of attention in recent years. 
Books and articles give access to the relevant texts, and explain the intricacies of the 
arguments involved. One question does not, however, seem to have attracted the 
attention it deserves: Why was this theory developed in the first place? What problems 
was it meant to solve? Among the answers that have been proposed to this question I 
briefly mention two. According to Erich Frauwallner, the apoha theory was created to 
solve a problem connected with logical theory.1 However, Frauwallner's own 
explanations suggest rather that Dignåga's theory of inference served as an example for 
the apoha theory, perhaps that the two had been created together.2 The latter did not 
however solve any problem of logical theory. Bimal Krishna Matilal (1990: 38), who 
echoes here the opinion of various earlier scholars, held the opinion that "[t]he apoha 
doctrine [was] first introduced by Di∫någa to account for the origin of knowledge of the 
object in the hearer from hearing the word (ßabda) without conceding objective thing-
universals." But was this the only, or even the main reason? Is it conceivable that the 
apoha theory constituted an answer to more pressing problems? It has to be conceded 
that various factors may have contributed to the creation of the apoha theory. I do not, 
therefore, claim that what I am going to present here is the final and definitive historical 
explanation of that theory. It may however draw attention to one aspect of the issue 
which has not so far, as it seems to me, drawn the attention which it may deserve. 
 The theory of apoha was invented (if that is the right term to use) by Dignåga, 
and presented for the first time in his Pramåˆasamuccaya, probably his last work. The 
term apoha had been used, to be sure, by Bhart®hari before him, and it is not impossible 
                                                
1 Frauwallner (1959: 101 (777)): "Dignåga's Lehre von der Sonderung von anderem ist also geschaffen, 
um ein Problem aus dem Gebiet der Schlussfolgerung zu lösen." 
2 See Frauwallner (1959: 103 (779)): "Die Lehre vom Begriff als Sonderung von anderem, wie sie 
Dignåga im 5. Kapitel des Pramåˆasamuccaya vorträgt, wurzelt in seiner Auffassung der 
Schlussfolgerung und ist von ihr aus entwickelt." P. 104 (780): "Wir kommen also zu dem Ergebnis, dass 
Dignåga seine Lehre von der Vorstellung im Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von der Schlussfolgerung 
geschaffen hat." 
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that he was indeed Dignåga's source.3 The apoha theory, on the other hand, is 
Dignåga's. Why did he develop it? 
 The name of Bhart®hari has just been mentioned, and there is no doubt that this 
Brahmanical author has exerted a major influence on Dignåga's thought. This is 
particularly evident in what may have been Dignåga's earliest work, the 
Traikålyapar¥k∑å (or Trikålapar¥k∑å). This work, as is well-known to scholars, is hardly 
more than a copy of part of Bhart®hari's Våkyapad¥ya, of a section of the 
Sambandhasamuddeßa, to be precise. This proves, if proof was needed,4 that Dignåga 
was intimately acquainted with the Våkyapad¥ya, and that there were parts of this work 
(or at least one part) with which he agreed to the extent of being willing to lend his own 
name to it, with hardly any modifications. 
 The part of the Våkyapad¥ya which Dignåga copied in the Traikålyapar¥k∑å, 
contains some verses which refer to a problem that occupied Bhart®hari also elsewhere 
in the same work. Verses 61 and 62 of the Sambandhasamuddeßa, in particular, which 
correspond to Traikålyapar¥k∑å 10 and 11, state that something non-existing cannot 
come into being, and that something existing does not disappear. The cause of 
something non-existent, moreover, is ineffective, precisely because that something does 
not exist. The cause of something that does exist, on the other hand, has no function, 
because that something is already there.5 
 These kinds of arguments are referred to elsewhere in the Våkyapad¥ya, too. 
They are the kinds of arguments that had been formulated and systematically used, 
perhaps for the first time, by Någårjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka. Bhart®hari was 
obviously very concerned about these arguments, because he offers at least three 
solutions to them, which I have dealt with elsewhere. Bhart®hari's solutions are not 
immediately relevant to the present paper, so I will not discuss them here. The 
important thing to be noted is that these kinds of arguments are so characteristic of the 
style of reasoning of Någårjuna that it seems to me completely safe to state that 
Bhart®hari had been influenced, directly or indirectly, by Någårjuna. 
 But if this is true, also Dignåga was acquainted with the arguments of 
Någårjuna, or at least with certain among them. This is in itself hardly surprising. What 
is surprising is that Dignåga at some point of his life, probably in his youth, had been so 
                                                
3 Vkp 3.1.100, 3.14.102. Cp. Hattori, 1977: 50. Also Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya 6.4 uses the 
term; see van Bijlert, 1992: 601. 
4 Verses from the Våkyapad¥ya are also cited in the Pramåˆasamuccayav®tti; see Hattori, 1968: 6 with n. 
33. 
5 Vkp 3.3.61ab, 62: nåbhåvo jåyate bhåvo naiti bhåvo 'nupåkhyatåm/ ...// abhåvasyånupåkhyatvåt 
kåraˆaµ na prasådhakam/ sopåkhyasya tu bhåvasya kåraˆaµ kiµ kari∑yati// . See, on these verses and on 
the Sambandhasamuddeßa as a whole, Houben, 1995, esp. p. 283 f. Houben translates: "Neither is abhåva 
‘something non-existent’ born as bhåva ‘something existent’, nor does bhåva ‘something existent’ go to a 
state beyond specification (i.e. become abhåva ‘non-existence’). ... Because abhåva ‘non-existence or a 
non-existent thing’ is beyond specification, a cause cannot be effective [towards it]; but what can a cause 
do to bhåva ‘existence or an existent thing’ that has specific designations?" 
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impressed by these arguments that he published some of them in a work, the 
Traikålyapar¥k∑å, of which he himself assumed the authorship. This is surprising, 
because none of his later works appear ever to present these same or similar arguments 
again. What is more, Richard Hayes, probably the most recent scholar who has 
published a full-length book on Dignåga's Pramåˆasamuccaya (1988), has claimed, in 
an even more recent paper (1994: 299), that "Någårjuna's writings had relatively little 
effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy". He also states there: 
"And despite Någårjuna's radical critique of the very possibility of having grounded 
knowledge (pramåˆa), the epistemological school of Dignåga and Dharmak¥rti 
dominated Indian Buddhist intellectual circles, ... without any explicit attempt to answer 
Någårjuna's criticism o[n] their agenda." Elsewhere Hayes (1988: 13) observes that "we 
find in [Dignåga's] Pramåˆasamuccaya no explicit references to Mådhyamaka (sic!) 
notions, and we certainly find no systematic attempt to come to terms with arguments 
delivered by Någårjuna or subsequent M[a]dhyamaka authors." What then happened to 
Dignåga's interest in Någårjuna's arguments after his early years? Do we have to agree 
with Hayes, who claims that "Någårjuna's arguments, when examined closely, turn out 
to be fallacious and therefore not very convincing to a logically astute reader"? Did 
Dignåga, after the Traikålyapar¥k∑å, discover the fallaciousness of Någårjuna's 
arguments and decide to ignore them henceforth? 
 I believe it is possible to maintain that Hayes is mistaken on both counts: not all 
of Någårjuna's arguments are logically fallacious; and Någårjuna was not ignored by all 
who came after him — even if the interest in him seems to have declined dramatically 
after Dignåga, for very good reasons, as I shall try to show below.6 A number of texts, 
both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, most of them from the period between Någårjuna and 
Dignåga, show in my opinion that Någårjuna was not ignored during that time. I cannot 
present all the evidence here. I will however mention once again Bhart®hari who, as I 
pointed out earlier, was very concerned with some of Någårjuna's arguments. I also 
devoted an article to an analysis of a major part of Någårjuna's arguments in which I 
have tried to show that this part of Någårjuna's arguments can be understood, and 
becomes logically sound, on the assumption that Någårjuna believed (consciously or 
unconsciously) in the close correspondence between words and things. His belief can be 
formulated more precisely, but still tentatively, as follows: "the words of a statement 
correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute together the situation described by 
                                                
6 Eli Franco, in a lecture delivered in October 1997 at the The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 
in Tokyo, has drawn attention to the peculiar views of the 9th century commentator Prajñåkaragupta 
(author of the Pramåˆavårttika-bhå∑ya or -ala∫kåra, commenting on Dharmak¥rti's Pramåˆavårttika) who 
maintained that a future thing can exert a causal influence on a present event, and who support his 
position by referring to phrases like "The sprout arises" and "He makes a pot" (a∫kuro jåyate, gha†aµ 
karoti; PrvBh p. 68, on verse 2.50), precisely the kind of phrases that troubled pre-Dignåga thinkers so 
much. I thank Eli Franco for drawing my attention to this. 
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that statement". I have called this the ‘correspondence principle’. I cannot repeat here 
the arguments that led me to formulate this principle and I have to refer to the articles 
concerned for further details.7 I must however emphasize that I do not claim that 
Någårjuna's arguments are about language. They are not; they are, without a shade of 
doubt, about the phenomenal world, which they try to prove to be self-contradictory. 
For the remainder of this paper I will take my earlier conclusions for granted and 
proceed on the assumption that indeed for Någårjuna the words of a statement 
correspond to the things that together constitute the situation described by that 
statement. Once the correctness of the correspondence principle is accepted, Någårjuna-
like contradictions come up almost of their own. The statement "Devadatta makes a 
jar", for example, requires, on that assumption, there to be Devadatta, the act of making, 
and the jar, just as the words of the less problematic sentence "Devadatta reads a book" 
correspond to the three items Devadatta, reading and a book. However, when Devadatta 
makes a jar there is no jar. If there were one it wouldn't have to be made. 
 Let us be clear about it that logically there is nothing wrong with this last 
argument. The problem lies not with logic but with the correspondence principle. One 
might simply reject it and state that no one-to-one correspondence between the words of 
a statement and the things that constitute the situation described is required. Judging by 
the early Indian authors whose reactions to this problem I am acquainted with there was 
a tendency not to reject the principle. Rather, thinkers would claim, for example, that 
future or past objects exist, so that words would refer to existing things even in the case 
of statements like "Devadatta makes a jar". Others, whose ontological views allowed 
such a solution, would indicate that, to stick to our example, the word ‘jar’ in 
"Devadatta makes a jar" denotes not the individual jar that does not yet exist but the 
universal (‘jar-ness’ or the like) that inheres in all jars and that is always present. The 
solution to Någårjuna's arguments, or at least to the arguments that are based on the 
correspondence principle, lies therefore, or can lie, in semantics. The central question 
is: what exactly do words denote? If they denote individuals, Någårjuna's arguments 
stand. If we don't like Någårjuna's conclusions, the question presents itself: what then 
do they refer to? 
 I have already indicated that Någårjuna's arguments were not so catastrophic for 
the Brahmanical thinkers belonging to the Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika schools of thought. 
They accepted the existence of universals, and we have already seen how convenient 
that could be. Let me observe in passing that the threat of Någårjuna for the 
Sarvåstivådins wasn't all that terrible either. They maintained that a future jar (more 
precisely: future dharmas; for ease of exposition I'll ignore the difference at this 
                                                
7 Bronkhorst, 1996; 1997. 
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moment) exists, so the problem connected with the statement "Devadatta makes a jar" 
was practically non-existent for them: the word ‘jar’ refers to the existing jar which 
finds itself as yet in the future. The Yoga SËtra and its Bhå∑ya accept exactly the same 
solution, whereas the Såµkhya school of thought accepted the closely similar doctrine 
of satkåryavåda, which, too, allowed for the existence of objects before their coming 
into being. By and large one can say that two types of answers found most favour with 
the different schools of thought: either they admitted that words refer to individuals but 
stipulated that individuals exist already before they come into being; or they claimed 
that there is such a thing as a universal, which then constitutes the denoted object of a 
word. Both these answers have in common that they allow the correspondence principle 
to remain valid. Let me further point out here that both the Nyåya SËtra and its Bhå∑ya, 
where they introduce the notion that words refer to universals along with forms and 
individuals, mention the example "he makes a mat" as an example to show the 
impossibility to maintain that words denote individuals only. 
 The problem was however far more serious for those who neither accepted the 
existence of universals nor the position that future things exist. Many Buddhists found 
themselves in this situation. What could they do? 
 It is here, I believe, that Dignåga's apoha theory provided an answer. Words do 
not refer to individuals, he points out at the beginning of the chapter concerned, which 
is chapter 5 of the Pramåˆasamuccaya. Universals, on the other hand, do not exist. 
However, the apoha theory creates something which is as good as the universals of the 
Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika schools but without ontological implications. The problems posed by 
Någårjuna's arguments (i.e., the ones based on the correspondence principle) are 
therefore now solved, also for these Buddhists. It has to be admitted, of course, that 
strictly speaking Dignåga abandons the correspondence principle. In his apoha theory 
there is nothing in the situation described by a sentence that corresponds to the words of 
that sentence. The apoha theory signifies therefore a departure from the correspondence 
principle. This departure is justified by pointing at the close similarity — Dignåga 
might say: essential identity — between the process of denotation and logical inference. 
Both are based on exclusion, according to Dignåga. 
 One might think that the link between Någårjuna's arguments and Dignåga's 
apoha theory is not all that obvious. And indeed, Dignåga does not present his theory as 
a solution to the problems posed by Någårjuna. But then he does not seem to present it 
as a solution to any particular problem at all. Yet historical scholarship should always 
try to determine the problem-situation of the thinker it studies. In the case of Dignåga 
we are extremely fortunate, for his Traikålyapar¥k∑å shows that he was, or had been, 
concerned with the problems evoked by Någårjuna. It may very well be that his apoha 
theory solved, or was meant to solve, other questions than the one to which I have 
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drawn attention. It seems however inconceivable that a thinker of Dignåga's stature 
should not have realized that this theory would answer Någårjuna's arguments. And it is 
very tempting to think that his earlier involvement with these arguments explains to at 
least some extent his creation of the apoha theory. 
 A final possible objection has to be dealt with here.8 Were the correspondence 
principle and the problems it evoked still an issue among Buddhist thinkers at the time 
of Dignåga? Isn't the Traikålyapar¥k∑å an exception, perhaps difficult to explain but not 
at all typical for Buddhist thought at that time? Had the correspondence principle and its 
supposed consequences not been discarded by earlier Buddhist thinkers, among them 
Vasubandhu the author of the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya? In order answer this question, 
we have to consider that the Buddhist thinkers who did concern themselves with this 
principle and its consequences did so in the context of everyday reality. Någårjuna had 
done so and concluded from it that everyday reality does not exist. If we want to find 
out whether the correspondence principle was still relevant for Vasubandhu we must 
primarily pay attention to passages in his Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya that deal with 
everyday reality. Such passages are not frequent, for this work deals primarily with the 
higher reality of dharmas where the correspondence theory does not apply in its usual 
manner. However, one passage, which criticizes the position of a grammarian (at least 
according to the commentator Yaßomitra), speaks about the everyday world and uses in 
this context arguments that show that for Vasubandhu the correspondence principle was 
still very much a factor that applied to this level of reality. The grammarian criticizes 
Vasubandhu's interpretation of the expression prat¥tyasamutpåda, according to which it 
means "appearance having reached". The grammarian protests, pointing out that the 
absolutive prat¥tya "having reached" indicates that the action of reaching precedes that 
of appearing, i.e. of coming into being, which is absurd. No, replies Vasubandhu, for at 
the level at which the grammarian argues the problem is not confined to the expression 
prat¥tyasamutpåda. In fact, nothing can come into being at that level. A solution is only 
possible at the level of the dharma-theory, for there there is no distinction between an 
agent and the action it performs. The relevant part of the discussion reads:9 
 
There is nothing wrong [with our position]. The grammarian (ßåbdika) should be 
asked in what state, present or future, something comes into being. If something 
that is present comes into being, how can it be present without having come into 
being? Alternatively, if something comes into being that has already come into 
being, this would lead to an infinite regress. And if something future comes into 
                                                
8 This question was actually raised by Tom Tillemans during the conference. I thank him for this 
thoughtful reflection, and hope that the following observations constitute a satisfactory answer. 
9 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 138 l. 10-13: nai∑a do∑a˙/ idaµ tåvad ayaµ pra∑†avya˙ ßåbdika˙/ kimavastho 
dharma˙ utpadyate vartamåna utåho 'någata iti/ kiµ cåta˙/ yadi vartamåna utpadyate/ kathaµ vartamåno 
yadi notpanna˙/ utpannasya vå punar utpattåv anavasthåprasa∫ga˙/ athånågata utpadyate katham asata˙ 
kart®tvaµ sidhyati (the edition has siddhaty) akart®kå vå kriyeti/. 
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being, how can something non-existent be the agent [of the action of coming 
into being] or how can there be the action [of coming into being] without agent? 
 
This is a clear example of reasoning based on the correspondence theory. Indeed, 
Vasubandhu insists that there has to be something corresponding to the agent/subject in 
a phrase like "the jar comes into being". It is true that he has a way to avoid these 
difficulties (as do practically all thinkers of the period preceding Dignåga who are 
confronted with these contradictions), which it is not necessary to discuss here in detail. 
The main thing is clear: the correspondence principle was still considered valid by 
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